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Abstract
Multinational enterprises frequently start, acquire, close and divest a¢ liates. There is a large
literature on restructuring, which focuses on start-ups and acquisitions. The empirical literature
on plant survival usually provides evidence from a single country. In contrast, this paper uses
detailed survey data of Swedish multinationals to examine the characteristics that result in plant
divestiture at the a¢ liate, rm, industry, country and regional level. We provide propositions
drawn on a straightforward model from Berg et al (2012) in which the primary motive to divest
an a¢ liate is to nance other investments in the network of the MNC. In line with conclusions
from our model, we nd that larger a¢ liates are more likely to be divested and these a¢ liates
are small relative to the other operations of the rm in the same country or region. We also nd
that divestiture begets divestiture, but acquisition does not, thus casting doubt on the notion
of footloose multinationals. Several rm, industry and country characteristics also matter.
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1 Introduction
Traditional theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) shed light on trade and FDI ows, but they
do not adequately address the fundamental issue of internalization which includes not only entry
and exit but also the organizational form of a multinational corporation (MNC) across borders. In
recent years, the literature has started lling this void and has brought in tools from the theory
of the rm to study the boundaries of multinational rms.1 Concurrently, as once unavailable,
rich, plant/rm level survey data became available, we have seen a tremendous extension of micro
data work exploring the behavior of multiplant rms in the US, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Portugal,
Turkey, Indonesia and many others. Yet, there remains a gap in the existing empirical literature
about the organization of multinational rms across boundaries, in particular about the decisions
of multinationals to divest a¢ liates.
The dominance of MNCs in international trade and their presence in labor markets require a
careful analysis of divestiture from di¤erent markets all around the world. There are at least two
reasons to study plant sales of multinational corporations: (i) To understand why and how a multi-
national restructures its operations globally (Even though divestiture is a big part of restructuring,
the literature heavily emphasizes acquisitions), (ii) To understand the impact of multinational re-
structuring on host economies. When foreign a¢ liates exit a country due to a shift of investment
to another, the major policy challenge for that country is to maintain its relative attractiveness for
FDI. This is especially important for investment that does not involve high sunk costs, and is thus
more footloose in nature.
This paper studies the decision of a multinational rm to divest a foreign plant. This decision
must be seen in the context of the rms complex location strategies that involve all possible
locations. Multinational a¢ liate divestiture is the result of a plethora of factors, some external
and some internal to the rm. Some plant sales are a product of relocation of activities to low-
cost production sites in order to cut costs in increasingly competitive world markets. Some are
spurred by changes in the economic environment, which can a¤ect specic industries. For example,
in industries associated with the product life-cycle, plant divestitures may occur as a result of
massive concurrent exits when the activity reaches maturity. Other sales are motivated by strategic
considerations such as a decision to focus on core business and divest from non-core activities.
Plant sales also take place when multinationals merge: some operations are eliminated to avoid
duplication and to achieve the cost savings that often drive mergers in the rst place.
A primary motive in the theoretical part of this paper to divest an a¢ liate is to nance other
investments in the MNCs network. We adapt the model of Berg, Norbäck and Persson (2012),
who analyze mergers and acquisitions with nancial constraints, to a setting whith a given buyer
and seller. The main assumption in their model is that nancial constraints a¤ect rms cost
of capital which, in turn, a¤ects their ability to conduct investment after an ownership transfer.
We examine an MNC with two a¢ liates which di¤er in quality. Each a¢ liate/rm produces a
1See Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Grossman and Helpman (2004) and Grossman, Helpman
and Szeidl (2006).
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good under monopoly. At the outset, the MNC wishes to invest in order to increase its productive
e¢ ciency. Since nancing costs increase in external borrowing, the MNC cannot nance investment
to improve both a¢ liates. It can, however, reduce its costs for external nancing by selling one
of its a¢ liates, since this increases its cash holdings. At lower borrowing costs, the MNC will be
able to invest and restructure the remaining a¢ liate. There is also another (foreign) rm which
can potentially acquire one of the a¢ liates. Which a¢ liate is sold o¤ and under what price is then
determined through Nash-bargaining between the rms.
This simple model generates two distinct results: (i) The MNC can only sell an a¢ liate if the
a¢ liate has su¢ ciently high quality assets. (ii) Given that both a¢ liates have assets of su¢ cient
quality, the rms will agree to a deal where the MNC sells the a¢ liate which has the lowest quality
assets among its other a¢ liates. If we assume that the quality of a¢ liate assets is correlated with
the size of an a¢ liate, the rst result implies that an MNC will only be able to sell an a¢ liate with
su¢ cient size; but among the a¢ liates that have su¢ cient size, it will sell the smallest.
We then take these predictions to the data using condential Swedish MNC data. The survey
data of Swedish multinationals is uniquely suited to shedding more light on divestitures because
it provides information along several important dimensions at the plant, the rm and the country
level. In the 2003 survey, rms were specically asked about plant divestitures and closures during
the previous ve years, as well as about start-ups and acquisitions. Moreover, they are asked to
provide a complete list of a¢ liate operations worldwide, including Sweden. This enables us to
investigate the decision to divest an a¢ liate in the context of the entire network of operations of
the rm.
We do indeed nd that larger a¢ liates as measured by employment are more likely to be
divested. As expected, we do also nd that when an a¢ liate increases in size relative to the size of
other a¢ liates of the rm in the same country or region, the likelihood of being divested decreases.
In addition, when adding variables which capture the global network of the rm, we nd that the
existence of more and geographically close a¢ liates increases the likelihood of divestiture. Finally,
plant sales elsewhere increase the probability of divestiture, but acquisitions elsewhere, regardless
of whether at the country, regional or global level, do not. This result counters the "footloose"
multinationals argument.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses the recent
literature on a¢ liate exit which lacks an analysis of divestitures. Section 3 describes the theoretical
model. Section 4 lays out the empirical analysis and gives detailed descriptions of a¢ liate, rm,
industry and country level variables used in the estimations. Section 5 reports the empirical results
which are followed by conclusions.
2 Previous literature
The determinants of entry and exit dynamics of rms have been a lively area of theoretical and
empirical research. The seminal theoretical analyses such as Nelson and Winter (1982), Jovanovic
(1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Ericson and Pakes (1995) have helped shape the recent empirical
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work which was made possible by the availability of panel data on rms/plants in the last couple of
decades. A great deal of stylized facts emerged from these empirical papers on the role of hetero-
geneous rms, international trade, foreign ownership, product markets, rm structure, geography
and agglomeration in the survival and exit of plants.2
Firstly, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) and Dunne, Klimek and Roberts (2005) em-
phasize the role of plant size as one of the determinants of plant exit. The selection models of
Jovanovic (1982) or Pakes and Ericson (1998) suggest that newly born plants go through a process
of learning including but not limited to acquiring capital, training the workforce, and establishing
distribution networks. Small plants may not have easy access to labor, capital or resource markets,
which in turn may increase their operating costs and force them to exit earlier than a larger rm.
Therefore, as plants get older and bigger they are more likely to remain. There is an abundance of
work conrming these ndings.3
Secondly, producing multiple products plays an important role in determining plant survival.
Multiproduct plants are larger and more productive than single-product rms. For example, Dunne
et al. (1989) nd that while 59% of rms produce a single product, multiproduct rms account
for 91% of output in a sector. Moreover, there are sunk costs associated with producing multiple
products which reduces the incumbent competition and thus the probability of plant exit. Bernard
and Jensen (2007) nd supporting evidence for this argument.
Thirdly, survival probability of a recently acquired plant is ambiguous. The acquisition can
be a bad match or it may have been intended to allow the rm to reduce the capacity in the
industry (horizontal acquisition). If the plant is acquired to strengthen the already existing plants
of the parent through forward or backward linkages (vertical acquisition) then the odds of survival
increase. Bernard and Jensen (2007) nd that recently acquired plants are more likely to be closed.
Lastly, plant level productivity is an important determinant of plant exit. The recent hetero-
geneous rm models in international trade (Melitz, 2003 and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum
2003) and their antecedents (Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995 and Olley and Pakes 1996)
all predict that low productivity plants are more likely to exit the industry.
In light of this earlier literature our papers contributions are twofold: (i). While earlier work
almost uniformly emphasizes plant exit, our data demonstrate the overwhelming importance of
plant sales, in other words, divestitures, rather than complete shut-downs. Therefore, in this paper,
we are able to investigate multinational divestiture dynamics. (ii). Di¤erent from the existing
empirical work we are able to explore the global restructuring of multinational rms. Earlier work
explores the exit of multiplant or multinational rms in one country. Granted, multiplant and
multinational rms have many common traits, but they are not the same. Many multinational
rms have operations in numerous countries, but also frequently start up or acquire new a¢ liates
2 Interested readers can refer to the comprehensive surveys of this literature that date back to Audretsch
and Siegfried (1992), Siegfried and Evans (1994), and Caves (2007).
3Bernard and Jensen (2007), Taymaz and Özler (2007) [Turkey], Alvarez and Görg (2009) [Chile], Green-
away, Gullstrand and Kneller (2008) [Sweden], Inui, Kneller, Matsuura and McGowand (2009) [Japan] and
Baldwin and Yan (2010) [Canada] are the most recent examples. Some of these studies rely on qualitative
choice models such as probit and multinomial logit while others use duration models.
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as well as close or divest existing ones. Unlike many national rms that exit the market altogether,
multinational rms sell or close plants even as their operations expand at home, in other countries
and frequently even in the country of the a¢ liate in question. While there is a considerable literature
on the determinants of plant location and the scope of a rms operations abroad, relatively little
is known about the determinants of a rms decision to abandon a plant in a particular location,
either via closure or divestiture. Our paper addresses this gap in the literature.
3 Theory
The model is a simplied version of Berg et al. (2012). Consider two rms, H and F . Firm H
is a multinational rm which has two a¢ liates, a1 and a2. These a¢ liates may be located in the
same host country or in separate host countries. There is also a foreign rm, F . For the sake of
simplicity, the foreign rm is assumed to have only one a¢ liate f:4
Berg et al. (2012) analyze mergers and acquisitions with nancial constraints. The main
assumption is that nancial constraints a¤ect rms cost of capital which, in turn, a¤ects their
ability to conduct investment after an ownership transfer. As shown in Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
the capital cost is higher under external nancing due to information, agency or risk aversion
problems. For instance, if rm F buys a¢ liate a1, this will reduce its cash holdings. The reduction
in cash holdings will increase its investment cost as it will be more costly for rm F to nance
new investments (as lenders will demand a higher interest rate). In contrast, rm H, the seller
of a¢ liate a1, will see an increase in its cash holdings, which reduces its borrowing costs for new
investments.
In the remainder of the section the following timing of events is assumed: In the rst stage rm
H can sell one of its a¢ liates to rm F . In the second stage, rms decide on whether to make an
investment in a new asset k to reduce their costs. The third and nal stage is the product market
interaction.
To highlight the main mechanisms and get predictions for our empirical analysis of divestitures
of the a¢ liates of Swedish MNCs, we will further simplify Berg et al. (2012). Firm H decides
on whether or not to sell and rm F decides whether or not to buy. Due to the sale of one of
its a¢ liates, rm H increases its cash holdings and invests in a signicant improvement of the
remaining a¢ liate. Financing costs are assumed to be too high to improve both a¢ liates. On the
other hand, since the acquisition reduces Firm Fs cash holdings, Firm F cannot make such an
investment.
In the next three subsections, we analyze under what conditions rm H will sell an a¢ liate to
rm F and which of the two a¢ liates is sold. We rule out that rm H sells both a¢ liates, as the
Swedish MNCs to remain in the data set need to have at least one producing a¢ liate (i.e. remain
an MNC). To shed more light on the mechanisms, we assume that each a¢ liate holds a monopoly
and that there are no network e¤ects or spillovers between a¢ liates or competition e¤ects between
rms. We discuss a relaxation of these assumptions below.
4 It is easy to extend this framework into a network of several a¢ liates.
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3.1 Stage 3: Product market
The set of rms in the industry is Z = fH;Fg and the set of a¢ liates is A =fa1; a2; afg. Let
the action of an a¢ liate aj 2 A be xaj . Let laj denote the ownership of the a¢ liate aj where
laj = fh; fg. Here, h is used to indicate that an a¢ liate is owned by rm H and f is used to
indicate that an a¢ liate is owned by rm F . Let aj (xaj ;laj ) be the variable prot in an a¢ liate aj
when the ownership of a¢ liates is laj and the a¢ liate action is xaj . From the simplifying assumption
of monopoly, aj (xaj ;laj ) =

Paj   caj (laj )

Qaj ; where Paj =    Qaj is the inverse demand. Paj
is the price of the product made by a¢ liate aj , Qaj is its output and caj (laj ) is the marginal cost
under the ownership laj . The rst-order condition is Paj   caj (laj ) =Qaj from which we have the
optimal output and reduced-form prot for a¢ liate aj as usual:
Qaj (laj ) =
  caj (laj )
2
; aj (laj ) =
h
Qaj (laj )
i2
(1)
3.2 Stage 2: Investment
At this stage, rm H decides whether or not to invest in a marginal cost reduction  in a¢ liate
aj at cost G . Formally, we assume that:
caj (laj j) =c0   kaj   < caj (laj j0) =c0   kaj (2)
where caj (lj j) is the marginal cost in a¢ liate aj when the cost reducing investment is made and
caj (laj j0) is the marginal cost when no investment is made. Here, kaj > 0 represents the investment
in rm-specic assets (such as human capital of employees, patents, blueprints and procedures)
which provide cost savings to the rm.
As noted, we study rm Hs decision to sell an a¢ liate and we assume that only a su¢ cient
increase in cash-holdings allows a rm to invest in new rm-specic assets in order to signicantly
reduce its marginal cost. To capture this, let Gz(la1 ; la2) be the investment cost for rm z. We
then assume that
Assumption 1 (i)GH(h; f) = GH(f; h) = G < GH(h; h) and (ii)GH(h; f) < GF (h; f); GH(f; h) <
GF (f; h), GH(h; h) = GF (h; h)
Part (i) formalizes that investment costs are lower for rm H if it sells an a¢ liate. Again,
this mirrors the assumption that nancing is less costly when rm H sells one of its a¢ liates and
increases its cash holdings (assuming a positive sales price which will be shown to hold below).
Part (ii) says that rm F as the buyer of one of rm Hs a¢ liates will have a higher investment
cost. Again, this arises because when paying a positive acquisition price, rm F faces a reduction
in its cash holdings and therefore an increase in its nancing costs. We further assume that
Assumption 2 (i) a1(hj) GH(h; f) > a1(hj0), (ii) a2(hj) GH(f; h) > a2(hj0) and (iii)
aj (hj) G(h; h) < aj (hj0) for j = f1; 2g
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Thus, rm H can always nance an investment in its remaining a¢ liate if it sells the other
a¢ liate and cannot invest in both plants at the same time. We also assume that
Assumption 3 (i) a1(f j) GF (f; h) < a1(f j0), (ii) a2(f j) GF (h; f) < a2(f j0) and (iii)
af (hj) GF (h; h) < af (f j0)
Firm F as the acquirer will see a reduction in its cash holdings which makes it impossible to
invest in a cost reducing asset.
Finally, rm F incurs a transaction cost T when buying the a¢ liate. An acquisition is potentially
protable if and only if aj (f j0) T > 0; j = f1; 2g. In order for a foreign acquisition of a¢ liate
a1 or a2 to be potentially protable, the product market prot under an acquisition aj (f j0) must
exceed the transaction cost associated with a deal, T .
3.3 Stage 1: Divestment decision
We start our analysis by outlining the details of two cases: Divestment of a¢ liate a1 and divestment
of a¢ liate a2. To proceed, let z(l1; l2) =
X
lj2z
aj (lj j:) be the aggregate product market prot for
rm z, where (l1; l2) is the vector of ownership of the a¢ liates a1 and a2.
A¢ liate a1 is divested Given Assumptions 1-4, the Nash-Bargaining product in a negotiation
over the sale of a¢ liate a1 is:

a1(S) = [F (f; h) S   T  F (h; h)][H(f; h) G+ S  F (h; h)]1  (3)
where F (f; h) =a1(f j0) + af (f j0) is the aggregate variable prot for rm F when rm F buys
a¢ liate a1, F (h; h) =af (f j0) is the aggregate variable prot of rm F when no acquisition takes
place (status quo prot), H(f; h) =a2(f j) G is the variable prot for rm H when it sells a¢ l-
iate a1 and invests in upgrading in its remaining a¢ liate a2. Finally, H(h; h) =a1(hj0)+a2(hj0)
is the status quo prot for rm H. Here,  stands for the bargaining power of rm F .
The associated acquisition price of a¢ liate a1 is given as S1 = argmaxS 
a1(S); or:
S1 = (1  )[F (f; h)  T  F (h; h)]  [H(f; h) G H(h; h)] (4)
From (3), it is then useful to dene RF (f; h) = F (f; h) S1 T  F (h; h) as the net gain for rm
F from agreeing to buy a¢ liate a1 at price S1 : Furthermore, dene RH(f; h) = H(f; h)+S

1  
G  H(h; h) as the net gain for rm H from agreeing to sell a¢ liate a1at price S1 : Inserting the
acquisition price S1 from (4) in Rz(h; f), we obtain:
Rz(f; h) =
(
RF (f; h) = [(f; h) (h; h)]
RH(f; h) = (1  ) [(f; h) (h; h)]
(5)
where (f; h) =F (f; h)+H(f; h) is the aggregate prot when rm H sells a¢ liate a1 at S1 and
(h; h) =F (h; h)+H(h; h) is the aggregate prot when no deal is made.
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A¢ liate a2 is divested Given assumptions 1-4, the Nash-Bargaining product in a negotiation
over a sale of a¢ liate a2 is:

a2(S) = [F (h; f) S   T  F (h; h)][H(h; f) G+ S  F (h; h)]1  (6)
In (6), F (h; f) =a2(f j0) T +af (f j0) is the aggregate variable prot net of the transaction cost
when rm F buys a¢ liate a2, F (h; h) =af (f j0) is again the aggregate variable prot or rm
F when no deal takes place. H(h; f) =a1(f j) G is now the aggregate variable prot net of
the investment cost for rm H when it sells a¢ liate a2 and upgrades its a¢ liate a1, and nally,
F (h; h) =a1(hj0)+a2(hj0) is the status quo prot for rm H.
The associated acquisition price of a¢ liate a2, S2 = argmaxS 
a2(S), is then:
S2 = (1  )[F (h; f)  T  F (h; h)]  [H(h; f) G H(h; h)] (7)
As above, dene RF (h; f) = F (h; f) S1   T  F (h; h) as the net gain for rm F from agreeing
to buy a¢ liate a2 at price S2 . Furthermore, dene RH(h; f) = H(h; f)+S

1   G   H(h; h) as
the net gain for rm H to sell a¢ liate a1 at price S2 . Inserting the acquisition price S2 in (7) in
Rz(h; f) we obtain:
Rz(h; f) =
(
RF (h; f) = [
(h; f) (h; h)]
RH(h; f) = (1  ) [(h; f) (h; h)]
(8)
where (h; f) =F (h; f) T+H(h; f) G is the total aggregate prot when rm H sells a¢ liate
a2 at S2 to rm F , and (h; h) =F (h; h)  T +H(h; h) is the aggregate prot when no deal is
made.
3.4 When does a divestiture occur and which a¢ liate is divested?
To guide the empirical analysis, we investigate whether rm H divests an a¢ liate and if so which
a¢ liate is sold. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the quality of a¢ liate assets a1 and a2 are such that ka2 > ka1. Then,
(i) rm F will only agree to buy a¢ liate aj if the quality of its assets kaj are su¢ ciently high, i¤
kaj > k
min =
p
T   (ii) If both a¢ liates have a su¢ ciently high quality kaj > kmin, rm H and
rm F will agree on a divestiture of a¢ liate a1 which has the lowest asset quality.
Let us rst prove Proposition 1(i).5 Note that Firm F must obtain a positive net prot from
acquiring a¢ liate aj at a zero price at Sj = 0 in order to have an incentive to buy the a¢ liate
(ruling out negative prices). This net prot is
aj (f j0) T (9)
5Proposition 1 builds on Lemma 1 in Berg et al. (2012) where the size of the investment is
endogenous and where the roles as buyer and seller are endogenously determined.
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From (1) and (2), a strictly positive net prot aj (f j0) >T implies kj > kmin =
p
T . Intuitively,
in order to cope with the transaction cost inherent in an acquisition, the quality of the acquired
assets must be su¢ ciently high.
Let us then prove Proposition 1(ii). Note that from (5) and (8) both rm H and rm F will
prefer a divestment of the a¢ liate which gives the largest increase in aggregate prot. Both rms
agree that it is in their interest to have rm H sell a1 if and only if this will give rise to a higher
aggregate prot than the sale of a¢ liate a2, (f; h)>(h; f).
We can rewrite the latter condition as follows:
(f; h) (h; f) = H(f; h) H(h; f)| {z }
Firm Hs incentive to sell a1 rather than a2
  [F (h; f) F (f; h)| {z }]
Firm Fs incentive to buy a2 rather than a1
= a2(hj)  a1(hj)  [a2(f j0)  a1(f j0)] > 0
= 2(ka2   ka1) > 0 (10)
Thus, aggregate prot will be higher if rm H sells a¢ liate a1 and then invests in a¢ liate a2. This
happens because the quality of the assets in a¢ liate a2 is, by assumption, higher, ka2 > ka1 . To
see this, it is instructive to di¤erentiate (f; h) (h; f) in the cost reduction . Since ka2 > ka1 ,
output under an investment in a2 must be higher; Qa2(h) > Q

a1(h):
d((f; h) (h; f))
d
=
d [a2(hj)  a1(hj)]
d
= Qa2(h) Qa1(h) > 0 (11)
In short, larger cost savings when investing in the larger a¢ liate a2 nanced from selling a1
create the larger increase in aggregate prot. Since each rm gets a xed share of this increase,
both rms will prefer the divestiture of a1.
Finally, it is also interesting to explore how rm F is able to benet despite agreeing not to buy
the best a¢ liate. To see how, rewrite the acquisition price for a¢ liate a1 as follows:
S1 = a1(f j0)  T   (1  )[a2(f j) a2(f j0) G  T ] (12)
Firm F obtains a1(f j0)  T in net prot from buying a¢ liate a1which from (12) implies a rebate
on the acquisition price since S1 < a1(f j0)  T . The rebate is larger the larger is the increase in
variable prot for rm H from investing in a¢ liate a2, a2(f j) a2(f j0) > 0.
3.5 Discussion and Extensions
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we briey discuss major results and some extensions of
the model.
The rst result arises from the assumption of a transaction cost to be paid by the acquirer:
unless the quality of the a¢ liates assets are su¢ ciently high, there will be no surplus for the
buyer and hence no incentive to negotiate a deal. The second result is a direct consequence of the
assumption that nancing costs are a¤ected by wealth or cash holdings: selling an a¢ liate reduces
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the costs for external nance which enables the MNC to invest in the remaining a¢ liate. We then
show that if the investment increases, this reduces marginal cost and the MNC will sell the a¢ liate
with assets of lower quality and then with cash received invest in the a¢ liate with assets of higher
quality. This produces the largest gain in prots since the reduction in marginal cost a¤ects more
units in the larger a¢ liate. The buying rm will also agree to this deal, as the larger gain for the
MNC from investing in the a¢ liate of higher quality will be mirrored by a lower acquisition price.
It is straightforward to extend the model to more than two a¢ liates. Let the set of rms be
Z = fH;Fg and the set of a¢ liates be A =fa1; ::at:::; aN ; afg where rm H initially owns a¢ liates
fa1; ::; at; :::; aNg, where each a¢ liate is a monopoly. Firms will then negotiate a price Sat for
a¢ liate at. As in (8), each potential deal will give rise to a net-prot for each rm which will be
the status quo prot plus a share of the increase in aggregate prot when a¢ liate at is sold (where
the share is given by the bargaining strength). Firms will agree on the price which gives rise to
the largest increase on aggregate prots. With a transaction cost present, a¢ liate aj needs to be
associated with a su¢ ciently high quality of its assets kaj in order to give rm F an incentive to
participate in the deal, in line with Proposition 1(i). However, it will also be the case that when
the quality kaj increases even further, it is more likely that rm H will keep a¢ liate aj and sell
another a¢ liate, as it will be better to invest into an a¢ liate with higher quality assets in order to
get a larger benet from the investment, in line with Proposition 1(ii). This would be true even if
we allowed for multiple sales of a¢ liates.
With several a¢ liates in a network we could also introduce synergies or network e¤ects. Also
in this setting, there must be an incentive for the buyer to participate: to be sold, the quality of
the assets must again be su¢ ciently high. The seller will also invest in the a¢ liate that gives the
highest synergy or strongest network e¤ects. Through the Nash-Bargaining process, the buyer and
seller would coordinate the outcome that increases aggregate prot the most. This implies that an
a¢ liate with better quality assets or assets with the potential to generate larger synergies will not
be sold. As shown in Berg et. al. (2012), this will be true even in a setting with product market
competition, since the acquisition price will adjust to take into account how rms are a¤ected in
the post-acquisition market.6
4 Empirical analysis
There are several empirical implications emanating from the model. This subsection enumerates
these. The assets, denoted by kaj in the model, are proprietary (or rm-specic) assets which
represent knowledge about how to produce a cheaper or better product. This knowledge could
take the specic form of a patented process or it might simply rest on know-how shared among the
employees of multinational rms. In the MNC literature, the size of operations and extensiveness
6While our setting is very useful to derive prediction on how MNCs sell a¢ liates and how this is related to
di¤erent characteristics of these a¢ liates, it is harder to apply in situation where there are multiple potential
buyers. The reason is that there are no applied o¤-the shelf multi-rm bargaining models which easily
handle the externalities that arise under ownership changes. For examples of bargaining with externalities,
see Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a,b).
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of these rms-specic assets have proven to be highly correlated (Caves, 2007). Therefore, we will
use a¢ liate/rm size as an indicator of the quality of rm-specic assets owned by the rm.
Proposition 1(i) then suggests that an a¢ liate is more likely to be divested when it increases in
size: if an a¢ liate is too small and thus has low quality assets, its purchase will not give the acquirer
a positive net return due to the transaction cost T . Moreover, Proposition 1(ii) shows that given
that an a¢ liate is su¢ ciently large it will still be relatively small within the MNCs network to be
a candidate for divestment. The intuition here is that when the MNC sells an a¢ liate in order to
get resources to invest in another a¢ liate, it will obtain the highest return when investing in the
a¢ liate with higher quality assets.
These results produce a tension between the e¤ect of larger a¢ liate size on the divestment
decision: One the one hand, a larger a¢ liate becomes a more likely candidate for a divestiture as
size indicates that the quality of the assets inherent in the a¢ liate is su¢ cient to induce the acquirer
to participate in a deal despite the transaction costs. One the other hand, if a larger a¢ liate size
indicates higher quality assets, the MNC has an incentive to invest in that a¢ liate, making it less
likely that the MNC would want to sell it.
We attempt to capture these two opposing e¤ects of a¢ liate size on the divestment decision
using the following probit estimation model:
Pr(Divestaj = 1jsizeaj ; rel_sizeaj ;X) = 
 
0 + 1
(+)
sizeaj + 2
( )
rel_sizeaj +X
0
!
(13)
where (:) is the normal distribution, sizeaj is the size of an a¢ liate and rel_sizeaj is the af-
liates size relative to other a¢ liates in the network, below dened as rel_sizeaj = Affiliate
size=(Affiliate average size). Proposition 1(i) suggests that 1 > 0 as a¢ liates require a mini-
mum quality to be eligible for a deal. Proposition 1(ii) suggests that the MNCs sell their smaller
a¢ liates that pass the minimum size. In order to capture this implication of the model, we calcu-
late a relative a¢ liate size measure whose value increases when the a¢ liate becomes a larger one
relative to other a¢ liates in the MNCs network and thus we expect 2 < 0. That is, an increase
in relative size reduces the likelihood of the a¢ liate being sold. We now turn to a description of
our data used to estimate (13) as well as a discussion of additional control variables expected to
a¤ect the likelihood of divestiture.
4.1 Data
The core data come from surveys of Swedish multinational rms conducted by the Research Institute
of Industrial Economics (IFN). These surveys were conducted in regular intervals since 1965, with
the last one in 2003.7 The survey provides detailed information on the operations of these rms in
Sweden and abroad. It is unique in a number of ways. It provides a wealth of detailed information
on sales, inputs, trade, etc. It also asks about any foreign a¢ liates and provides information for
each a¢ liate as well as the economic relationship between the parent and the a¢ liate.
7With many Swedish multinationals now foreign-owned, the surveys were discontinued.
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For the central purpose of this paper, we utilize a question that was asked for the rst time in
the 2003 survey. The question asks whether a rm has acquired, started-up, closed or divested an
a¢ liate between the last survey year, 1998, and 2003. There are 1644 potentially usable a¢ liates
in the 2003 survey spanning 77 countries and 21 industries, listed in Tables 1 and 2. Of those, 228
were acquired or started-up and 110 were closed or divested since 1998.8 Our dependent variable
Divestaj takes on the value of one for each a¢ liate that was closed or divested and zero otherwise.
In practice, only one a¢ liate was reported closed, all others were divested.9 Similarly, most new
a¢ liates were acquired, very few were started-up. For more details about the survey in general, see
Ekholm and Hesselman (2000). For the 2003 survey, see Hakkala and Zimmermann (2005).
We supplement the survey data with industry and country level data from various sources.
The industry level minimum e¢ cient scale data come from Statistics Sweden and report sales,
employees, the number of rms and other data for two-digit industries in Sweden. We have data on
regulations, that vary by industry and country from the OECD, as collected by and described in
detail in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Data on GDP, labor and capital at the country level come
from the Penn World Tables. Education data is from Barro and Lee (2010 update).
We now describe our variables in detail.
4.1.1 A¢ liate-level variables
We start with the core variables, sizeaj and rel_sizeaj ; that we are interested in from the theory.
A¢ liate size: Ideally, sizeaj in equation (13) should be measured by quantity produced or sold.
However, consistent information on these variables is not available in the data set. Therefore,
we proxy size by the current number of employees Laj for surviving a¢ liates and the number of
employees at the time of exit for those that are divested. We use this variable in logarithmic scale
since a¢ liates vary considerably in size:
sizeaj = log(Laj ) (14)
where Laj is the number of employees in a¢ liate aj .
A potential concern with measuring a¢ liate quality kaj in terms of the log employment size
log(Laj ), is the labor saving e¤ect of asset quality: one might worry that a­ iates with higher
quality assets may generate large sales but then have very few employees. We do not believe this
to be a large problem for a number of reasaons.
Even in the simple monopoly, the number of workers can increase in asset quality. To see
this, note that the number of workers in an a¢ liate before a divestiture or investment is Laj (z) = 
c  kaj

Qaj (z). It can be shown that if the marginal cost is su¢ ciently low, c 2 (kaj ; kaj + 12),
a¢ liate employment Laj (z) increases in kaj . Note also that all results remain the same if we
8Unfortunately, only 261 can be linked to at least some information from prior surveys, thus constraining
the use of other a¢ liate and rm level control variables.
9Results do not change when that a¢ liate is omitted from the analysis.
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assumed that consumers willingness to pay is Paj =  + kaj   Qaj and that marginal cost is
caj = c; in particular, Proposition 1 still holds. Then, since there is an increase in output resulting
from higher asset quality, a¢ liate employment Laj (z) will always increase in the quality of the
assets kaj as well.
Whether or not asset quality indeed increases employment is an empirical question. We checked
this by running regressions of the log of a¢ liate sales, log(PajQaj ) on the log of a¢ liate employ-
ment log(Laj ) using a¢ liate xed e¤ects, country-industry pair xed e¤ects and numerous other
specications making use of the other survey years (which lack the divestiture information on a¢ l-
iates, but have sales). These regressions consistently produce a positive and statistically signicant
elasticity ranging from 0.6 to 1. A signcant, strictly positive elasticity of sales with respect to
employment, ElLajPajQaj , suggest that asset quality kaj drives both sales and employment, as
suggested by the theory, and, therefore, that we can use a¢ liate employment to proxy for a¢ liate
asset quality.
A¢ liate relative size: Now we turn to rel_sizeaj in equation (13). Since it is not obvious how
to measure relative size, we will do it several di¤erent ways.
First, we measure rel_size as the size of the a¢ liate relative to average a¢ liate size of the rm,
in log terms,
rel_sizeaj = log
0B@ LajP
aj2z
Laj=Az
1CA (15)
where
P
aj2z
Laj is the total number of employees in a¢ liates of rm z and Az is the total number of
a¢ liates of rm z. This measure adjusts for general size di¤erences among rms. If exp(rel_sizeaj )
is greater than 1, then the a¢ liate is larger than average.
Alternatively, we consider the share of the a¢ liates employment in total a¢ liate employment
in the country (m) or region (r),
size_shareajm =
LajP
aj2zm
Laj
or size_shareajr =
LajP
aj2zr
Laj
(16)
Irrespective of whether we calculate the size share in the host country or host region, the size share
variable takes values between 0 and 1 naturally. As it gets closer to 1, the relative importance of
the a¢ liate in the host country or in the host region increases for the rm.
4.1.2 Firm-level variables
A¢ liate size, size, and a¢ liate relative size, rel_size or a¢ liate size share, size_share, are the core
variables in our analysis. These variables are generated from our theoretical model. To assess the
robustness of these varaiables, we will also add a number of control variables. We rst complement
these variables with information on the rms network of a¢ liates and other characteristics of the
mother rm.
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Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the data. It shows the network of rm z. Firm z is active
in the home country and in four foreign countries, distributed over two regions. Firm z has ve
a¢ liates distributed over the four countries. We now turn to how we calculate di¤erent rm level
variables for the rms in the data.
Other A¢ liate(s): It may be the case that the probability of divestiture is higher for plants with
geographically close or in rms with a greater number of other a¢ liates. Concentrating production
in fewer plants may allow a rm to better exploit plant level scale economies. Moreover, when other
plants are present in the same market, some divestiture does not equal leaving a market altogether.
Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) [Indonesia], Mata and Portugal (2004) [Portugal], Görg and Strobl
(2003) [Ireland], Bernard and Jensen (2007) and Alvarez and Görg (2009) report higher exit rates
for multiplant rms. To assess the importance of having other a¢ liates in the same country/region,
we construct a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the a¢ liate is part of a rm with at
least one more a¢ liate in the same country/region,
oth_affzm =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one other a¢ liate of rm z in country m
otherwise
(17)
oth_affzr =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one other a¢ liate of z in region r but not in country m
otherwise
(18)
Number of Other A¢ liates: Rather than an indicator variable, we use the number of other
a¢ liates of rm z in the same country/region, namely num_othaffzm and num_othaffzr.
Other Acquisitions: A rm can also restructure its operations by switching sectors or acquiring
plants at the same time others are closed down or divested. This can happen in the same host
country, in the same host region or anywhere in the world.
Related recent empirical studies conducted in the single country framework are Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2006) and Greenaway et al. (2008, 2009). The former authors consider the decision
to cease production or switch sectors following being exposed to higher competition from low wage
countries. They nd that rms with low capital and skill levels are less likely to survive in the face
of increased competition from abroad and rms switch to more capital and skill intensive sectors
when exposed to lower levels of foreign competition. The latter authors consider rm choices
between alternative exit strategies, namely, closedown, switching sectors or being acquired, using
a multinomial probit model.
To assess the importance of whether or not having entry elsewhere, in the form of an acquisition
or a start-up within the same rm z, a¤ects a¢ liate a, we consider a dummy variable at the country,
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regional and global level,
oth_acqzm =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one acquisition by rm z in country m
otherwise
(19)
oth_acqzr =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one acquisition by rm z in region r but not in country m
otherwise
(20)
oth_acqz =
(
1
0
if 9 at least one acquisition by rm z anywhere
otherwise
(21)
Acquiring or opening a plant in another country could signal an intention to relocate production,
for example to a lower-cost location, attesting to the footloosenature of multinationals. It is also
consistent with the spirit of the model. Since an acquisition depletes cash reserves and thus increases
the nancing constraint and prevents investing in existing a¢ liates, it should raise the probability
of divestiture of another a¢ liate in order to ease the constraint and enable investments.
Other Divestiture(s): In the model, we could have multiple divestitures (as long as not all
a¢ liates are sold). However, the model is too simple to capture the entire set of dynamics which
link multiple divestitures. We also note that in this paper the e¤ect of divestitures or exits in other
regions or countries has not been examined in the single country framework of previous literature.
To control for these, we dene a dummy variable for other divested a¢ liates within the same rm
z, again at the country, regional and global level,
other_divestzm =
(
1;
0;
if 9 at least one other divestiture within rm z in country v
otherwise
other_divestzr =
(
1;
0;
if 9 at least one other divestiture within rm z in region r but not in country v
otherwise
other_divestz =
(
1;
0;
if 9 at least one other divestiture within rm z anywhere in the world
otherwise.
Controlling for other divestitures is important as rms often face negative shocks that a¤ect
multiple plants similarly. As a result, closures or divestitures are likely to be correlated across
the rms a¢ liate network. Alfaro and Charlton (2009) o¤er a complementary explanation for a
positive correlation of the existence of a¢ liates within a country. They nd evidence of what they
call intra-industry vertical FDI. At the four-digit industry level, there exist a¢ liates of an MNC
that produce specialized inputs for other a¢ liates in the same industry, thus making it more likely
for an a¢ liate to be divested when there are other divestments.
Degree of Internationalization: This variable measures the relative importance of foreign
sales of rm z in total sales,
for_sale_sharez =

Fz

z
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where 
Fz =
P
m6=Swe;
P
aj2zm;
PajQaj and 
z =
P
m;
P
aj2zm;
PajQaj denote the foreign and global sales
of rm z, respectively. A higher value indicates a higher degree of dependence on international
markets.
Labor Productivity: As has been shown in the burgeoning literature on heterogeneous rms
(Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003), higher productivity rms are more likely to export and are
more likely to be multinational and have a lower probability of leaving the market than lower
productivity rms. Since a rms productivity originates from rm-specic assets in, for instance,
technology and managerial skills, and the services of these assets can be moved across locations
of a rm at low cost, the mother rms productivity may inuence the decision to divest. As
productivity is heterogeneous across industries, we measure a rms productivity relative to its
two-digit industrys average productivity. Firm z is said to have a higher than industry average
labor productivity if
rel_lab_prodz =
(
z   
Fz )=(Lz   LFz )

l=Ll
> 1
where LFz =
P
m6=H;
P
aj2zm;
Laj and Lz =
P
m;
P
aj2zm;
Laj and 
h=Lh is the two-digit industrys average
productivity in Sweden for the industry l to which rm z belongs. Note that since our industry
level information is from Sweden only, we use only the Swedish portion of sales to calculate this
measure.
4.1.3 Industry-specic variables
Industry characteristics that we use in this paper are somewhat broader compared some used in
previous empirical work due to the unavailability of sector level sunk costs and concentration ratios
for a number of countries that the Swedish multinationals operate in.
Sunk Costs: In general, high industry sunk costs should reduce the likelihood of a¢ liate exit,
although it is less clear what the e¤ect is for a divestiture. Hopenhayn (1992) shows that exit
probability of existing plants in a sector is low if there exist high entry barriers or sunk costs since
they face less erce competition than otherwise, leading to hysteresis (Dixit and Pyndick, 1994).
Dunne et al. (1989), Geroski (1991a,b) [UK], Bernard and Jensen (2007), Greenaway et. al (2008,
2009) and Inui et al. (2010) support this conclusion. Our measure of sunk costs is the minimum
e¢ cient scale (average rm size in number of employees) in the industry of the parent rm in
Sweden. It is a stylized fact that large scale signals higher entry barriers and thus higher sunk
costs. This measure varies by rm size categories. For example, if a rm has 200 employees, we
use the average rm size of Swedish rms that have between 100 and 249 employees.
Regulation: The degree of competition should have an e¤ect on divestiture decisions as it directly
a¤ects an a¢ liates prots. On the one hand, higher market concentration may lead to higher mark-
ups in a sector, which should reduce the exit probability (Audretsch, 1995). On the other hand,
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competitive pressure by rivals in highly concentrated markets can cause immature exit. While
Burke, Görg and Hanley (2008) nd a negative impact of concentration on plant survival, i.e., new
plants are vulnerable to large incumbents with monopolistic power, Alvarez and Görg (2009), using
Chilean data, nd no signicant impact of concentration on the probability of exit. As a proxy for
concentration we use the potential costs of anti-competitive regulation in certain non-manufacturing
sectors for sectors in the economy that use the output of non-manufacturing sectors as intermediate
inputs in the production process. Although this is not a direct measure of concentration, it varies
by industry and country and thus has broader international coverage than standard measures of
concentration such as a Herndahl index or a rm-concentration ratio. As we do have information
on which industry rms belong to, we will in addition use industry specic e¤ects.
4.1.4 Country-specic variables
Our country level variables are mainly drawn from the traditional FDI literature (for example,
Brainard 1997; Markusen 2002; Carr et al. 2001; Blonigen et al. 2003) to control for the role of
country specic attributes in multinational a¢ liate exits. To measure income and size, we use the
log of real gross domestic product of country m , GDP. To measure openness to trade, we use the
variable Trade Opennesswhich is the log of trade volume divided by GDP in countrym. To control
for the education level of the work force, we use the log of average years of secondary or tertiary
education attained in country m, Skill:We also control for the productivity of the host country with
the log of the capital-labor ratio in country m, K-L Ratio.10 Finally, some specications will only
use country-specic e¤ects.
5 Results
We start of by providing information on country and industry coverage as well as simple summary
statistics for our basic sample of a¢ liates. As can be seen from Table 1, Swedish MNCs have
operations all around the world and operate in all the major industries (Table 2). Recall that
while the unit of observation is the a¢ liate and the basic question is what determines the survival
or divestiture of an a¢ liate over a ve-year period, many of these determinants are at the rm,
industry or country level or a combination thereof. Therefore, we group the variables used in
the analysis by their level of aggregation. Table 3 provides some basic summary statistics for the
sample. We have at most 1559 usable observations. Of these, 110 are a¢ liates that exited between
1998 and 2003 while the rest did not.
10We tried a bevy of other country level variables, such as a more general market access variable as in
Braconier et al. (2005), GDP per capita, capital and labor endowments. These generally proved statistically
insignicant and in any case did not alter any of the main results.
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5.1 Preliminaries
Before going into a detailed econometric analysis, we provide a couple of pieces of simpler infor-
mation to characterize the data and the determinants of a¢ liate divestiture. We start with a
mean-di¤erence analysis of our data. Table 4 compares the means of characteristics for retained
and divested a¢ liates. Note that some of these can be computed at the country or regional level,
while others only exist globally.  and  indicate whether the means are statistically signicantly
di¤erent at the ten and ve percent levels, respectively. We rst note that divested a¢ liates tend
to be larger, as measured by the number of employees, consistent with Proposition 1 (i). However,
as with all the raw numbers in this table, we caution that only a conditional analysis will show
whether these unconditional di¤erences hold up once we control for the full set of determinants of
a¢ liate divestiture.
Proposition 1 (ii) also asserts that an a¢ liate is more likely to be divested if it is small relative
to other a¢ liates. Since it is not obvious how this should be measured, we construct two di¤erent
measures, as discussed above. One is the size of an a¢ liate relative to the average size of a rms
a¢ liates (Relative Size); the other is the share of this a¢ liate in the a¢ liate network of a rm,
either in the same country or region (Size Share). In this simple mean comparison, the two
measures give conicting results. According to the Relative Sizemeasure, divested a¢ liates are
larger (recall, this measure is in natural logs), but the Size Shareindicates that divested a¢ liates
are signicantly smaller relative to other existing a¢ liates in the same country and the same region.
It is important to note that Proposition 1 implies that in any regression, both absolute a¢ liate
size as well as relative a¢ liate size must be included simultaneously. The two are of course also
related. When the absolute size of an a¢ liate increases, its relative size rises as well, holding other
a¢ liatessizes constant.
Many rm characteristics di¤er signicantly between retained and divested plants. Divestiture is
more likely when there exists another a¢ liate and when the number and size of these other a¢ liates
is large. This is consistent with the hypothesis that restructuring takes place and the divestiture of
an a¢ liate is not symptomatic of general troubles faced by the rm. This is underscored by the fact
that a sale is also more likely when there is an acquisition elsewhere, whether in the same country,
the same region, or anywhere globally within the same rm. At the same time, restructuring
does not appear to be limited to one a¢ liate, but a¤ects multiple ones as divestiture is also more
likely when there is divestiture elsewhere, again regardless of how we dene the relevant geographic
boundary. Finally, rms of divested a¢ liates are relatively less productive than those of retained
ones.
Interestingly, neither industry nor country characteristics appear signicantly di¤erent for re-
tained and divested plants. For the latter in particular, however, we note that this may simply be
due to the much smaller degree of variation as all a¢ liates located in the same country face the
same values for any of the country level variables.
Next, we turn to a visual examination of plant sales at the rm, industry and country level.
First, we dene a compact measure of a¢ liate divestiture, namely the divestiture rate, at the rm,
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industry and country level.11
The divestiture rate at the rm level is the number of divested a¢ liates of a multinational rm
in a certain country divided by the total number of a¢ liates of the same rm in the same country,
including both those retained and those sold. Figure 2 shows the divestiture rate drawn against
their share of foreign sales, which can be viewed as the degree of internationalization of Swedish
MNCs. As rms get more actively involved in foreign operations they start having access to external
and internal resources to overcome negative shocks. However, these rms may also be "footloose"
and have the exibility to close or sell a plant. Figure 2 shows that as the foreign sales share
rises, the divestiture rate falls. For example, among Swedish MNCs with a more than 80% foreign
sales share, 58 a¢ liates were divested between 1998 and 2003. There were 508 retained a¢ liates of
these rms in the same countries, giving an divestiture rate of 58/(58+508)=10%. In other words,
90% of the a¢ liates of Swedish MNCs with a very high degree of internationalization remained
between 1998 and 2003. This preliminary result goes against the footloose MNCs arguments in the
literature.
Figure 3 illustrates the divestiture rate at the industry level. In the automobile sector, for
example, 32 left out of a total of 255 and thus the divestiture rate is 13%. In high sunk cost
industries such as automobiles or fabricated metals the divestiture rates are low. However, there
does not seem to exist a very clear pattern and further analysis is necessary.
5.2 Probit Results
We turn now to our probit results, which can be found in Tables 5-7, as enumerated in (13). We
start o¤ simply in Table 5 by only including the variables suggested directly by the theoretical
model, absolute and relative a¢ liate size. Recall that Proposition 1 stipulates that (absolutely)
larger a¢ liates are more likely to be divested, but those that are small relative to other a¢ liates in
a rms network. We measure this relative size either relative to the average size of an a¢ liate or
relative to the size of the a¢ liate network in the same country or the same region. The results in
Columns (1)-(3) are as predicted by theory. Divestiture is more likely the larger the a¢ liate, but
the smaller it is relative to other a¢ liates. Since the measure of relative size does not a¤ect the
results, we will subsequently focus on results using the Relative Sizevariable. We emphasize at
this point already that the signs and signicance of the two central variables remain robust to the
inclusion of other controls, as discussed subsequently.
In Figure 4, we translate these estimates to the to the simple model with two a¢ liates in Section
3. Using specication (i) in Table 5 (without calculating marginal e¤ects) the probabality to divest
a¢ liate a1 is Pr(Divesta1 = 1jsizea1 ; rel_sizea1) = 
  3:6 + 0:41sizeaj   0:26rel_sizeaj. We
then let the size of these two a¢ liates run from 1 to 6000 employees and calculate sizea1 and
rel_sizea1 over this range using (14) and (15). The resulting probabality to divest a1 is shown as
the surface in Figure 4.
11We are unable to report our country level gures for condentiality reasons. In these gures we observe
that countries with bigger markets and stronger demand experience a lower degree of a¢ liate divestiture.
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Several things can be noted. Holding the size of a¢ liate a2 constant at the average number
of emplyees in the data (255 employees) and increasing the number of employees in a¢ liate a1,
increases the probabality of divesting a1. This is consistent with Proposition 1(i), which conjectures
that the acquiring rm - in order to recover transaction costs - will be interested in targets of
higher quality (as measured by larger size). However, the increase in the probability to divest a1 is
decreasing in the size of a2 . The concavity in the probabality to divest comes in part from the
functional form of the size variables but also reects Proposition1(ii) in that the MNC will want to
sell the least productive a¢ liate in order to invest in the more productive one.
To illustrate the latter e¤ect more clearly, we then hold the size of a¢ liate a1 constant at the
average number of employees in the data (255 employees) and then increase the number of employees
in a¢ liate a2. As can be seen, making the a¢ liate a2 larger will also increase the probabality of
divesting a1. An increase in the size of a2 - and hence a decrease in the relative size of a1 - signals
that a2 is the more productive one, and hence that a2 is the a¢ liate that the rm will want to keep
and invest in.
Let us now turn to controls calculated from the network of the rm. The rst set of additional
variables included is the presence of another a¢ liate as well as whether there is another divestiture
or an acquisition. Column (4) shows results for measuring these at the country level, Column
(5) at the regional level. Another divestiture robustly raises the probability of divestiture, but
an acquisition elsewhere does not. This indicates that restructuring does not occur via shifting
a¢ liates around, but by generally decreasing the number of a¢ liates. These are the rst set of
empirical results about global restructuring of a multinational without ignoring plant divestitures.
Replacing the dummy for the presence of another a¢ liate with the number of other a¢ liates
does not change the result with respect to other acquisitions and divestitures, although the number
of a¢ liates does not appear to matter for the divestment decision, only whether there remains
a presence in a country. As a nal check of the robustness of our central results, Columns (8)
and (9) include both measures of relative size and both measures of the presence of other a¢ liates.
Absolute a¢ liate size remains robustly positively correlated with divestiture, relative size negatively.
Divestiture still begets divestiture, but acquisition elsewhere does not.
In Table 6, we successively add other rm, industry and country level variables. The basic
variables that proved robust in the previous set of results is included every time. For the variables
that can be computed at either the regional or the country level, the latter was chosen. None of
the results would change if we instead chose the regional level ones.
The degree of internationality is negatively correlated with divestiture, as expected, although
it is not consistently statistically signicant.12 The industry level variables, on the other hand, do
not show any signicance. This could be because there is less variation at that level. Including
the regulation measure (in Column (3)) reduces the number of observations signicantly, since it is
only available for OECD countries, eliminating most developing countries from the sample. Since
it also turns out to be statistically insignicant, as in Alvarez and Görg (2009), indicating no major
12 Including instead or additionally the square of this variable also does not a¤ect the results and does not
produce consistent statistical signicance either.
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impact of concentration on divestiture, we omit it in subsequent regressions.
Country level variables show some statistical signicance. When they are included, standard
errors are adjusted for clustering. Divestitures are somewhat less likely in larger markets. Greater
openness to trade weakly appears to raise the likelihood of an a¢ liate sale, although replacing this
variable with a market access measure results in no signicance of the coe¢ cient. Other country
characteristics, including capital and labor endowments, results of which are not shown for space
reasons, are not statistically signicant.
In Table 7, regressions (1)-(3) include various types of xed e¤ects. Naturally, when we include
these, we have to omit some variables. For example, the inclusion of country xed e¤ects in column
(1) necessitates the omission of all country level variables as we have no time variation in the sample.
Nonetheless, all prior results hold. Likewise, the inclusion of industry or region xed e¤ects changes
none of the basic results, making us condent of their robustness. Finally, regression (4) includes
an additional dummy for the rm that has the most a¢ liate divestitures in the sample. While this
weakens some results, for example other divestitures are no longer signicant, many of the results
hold up. In particular, the absolute and relative a¢ liate size remain signicant with their signs as
predicted from the model.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the decision of a multinational rm to close or divest a foreign plant.
We drew on conclusions from a straightforward model building on Berg et al (2012) in which the
primary motive to divest an a¢ liate is to nance other investments in the network of the MNC.
Using data on the global operations of Swedish MNCs, we were able to analyze the divestiture
decision in the context of rmscomplex location strategies that involve all possible locations. This
is in contrast to the existing literature that has focused on rm operations in a single country to
study the characteristics that a¤ect the survival probability of plants.
In line with conclusions from our model, we nd that larger a¢ liates are more likely to be
divested and these a¢ liates are small relative to the other operations of the rm in the same
country or region. These two results show that transaction costs matter and exit from a market is
the product of a complex restructuring e¤ort within the multinational. Furthermore, our results
indicate that a¢ liates of more productive, more internationally engaged MNCs are less likely to be
divested. The latter may be explained by the fact that having access to a large production network
makes MNCs less vulnerable to negative shocks.
Our ndings suggest that a number of country characteristics matter. A¢ liates are more likely
to be sold in small markets and in those with low GDP per capita. The nding that a higher level
of education increases the odds in favor of divestments may be due to this measure acting as a
proxy for labor costs, which negatively a¤ect plant operations. Better access to foreign markets
reduces the probability of divesting, as expected, and in accordance with the observation that
MNCs account for a large share of global trade.
There are important and novel policy implications from the results. The lack of evidence on
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the footloose nature of multinational rms suggests that successful e¤orts by countries to attract
them may be a good long-run strategy. The importance of foreign market access underscores the
importance of complementary policies, i.e. not only those focused on investment, but also on trade.
Finally, it is in countriesbest interest to attract experienced multinationals with large international
networks as they are more likely to weather negative shocks.
While we have linked plant divestiture to a large number of plant, rm, industry and country
characteristics, there are several extensions of this work that are worth pursuing. Firstly, the model
can be extended to more than two a¢ liates to address synergies or network e¤ects. Secondly, in
the empirical part one could link divestiture to rm characteristics and the rms a¢ liate network
in prior years. This is in principle doable as the survey of Swedish MNCs has been carried out
every few years since 1965. However, only a subset of the responding rms in 2003 were surveyed
in earlier years, and similarly, a number of rms that were surveyed earlier are not in the 2003
sample. Thus, the sample size for such an exercise will be somewhat smaller.
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Table 2: List of Industries
SNI92 Industry
10 Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials
15 Food products
17 Textile
18 Wearing apparel, fur
19 Tanneries, luggage, handbags, footwear etc.
20 Wood and products of wood, cork, cane etc. , except furniture
21 Pulp, paper and paper products
22 Publishers and printers, recorded media
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machinery and equipment
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
36 Furniture
45 Construction
51 Wholesale and retail trade
85 Health and social work establishments
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Expected Signs
Expected Unit Mean Median Standard
Sign Deviation
Dependent Variable
Divest (A¢ liate Divestiture) dummy 0.067 0 0.250
A¢ liate Characteristics
A¢ liate Size + employees, ln 4.328 4.248 1.531
Relative Size - (given size) ln -0.875 -0.896 1.353
Size Share (Country) - (given size) 0.403 0.203 0.404
Size Share (Region) - (given size) 0.122 0.017 0.250
Firm Characteristics
Other A¢ liate (Country) dummy 0.762 1 0.426
Other A¢ liate (Region) dummy 0.928 1 0.259
Number of Other A¢ liates (Country) count 5.647 3 6.854
Number of Other A¢ liates (Region) count 37.24 22 36.81
Other Acquisition (Country) dummy 0.408 0 0.492
Other Acquisition (Region) dummy 0.735 1 0.441
Other Divestiture (Country) dummy 0.233 0 0.423
Other Divestiture (Region) dummy 0.446 0 0.497
Degree of Internationalization share foreign sales 0.707 0.749 0.209
Labor Productivity see text 1.111 0.951 1.082
Industry Characteristics
Sunk Costs - see text 1,030 836.8 551.3
Regulation see text 0.100 0.101 0.036
Country Characteristics
GDP Real $, ln 13.20 13.32 1.488
Trade Openness trade/GDP, ln 4.128 4.065 0.541
Market Access see text 26.73 27.10 1.873
Skill years school, ln -0.720 -0.618 0.608
K-L Ratio ln 10.97 11.29 0.782
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Table 6: Probits of Plant Divestiture on A¢ liate, Firm, Sector and Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A¢ liate Size 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.060***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Relative Size -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.042***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Other A¢ liate 0.056** 0.058** 0.055* 0.068*** 0.062** 0.089***
(Country) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029)
Other Acquisition -0.009 -0.007 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.014
(Country) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Other Divestiture 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.056***
(Country) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Degree of Inter- -0.051 -0.070* -0.121*** -0.052 -0.064* -0.063
nationalization (0.034) (0.036) (0.046) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041)
Labor Product. -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.019
(0.006) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013)
Sunk Costs -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.000
Regulation 0.248
(0.258)
GDP -0.012* -0.013* -0.019***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Trade Openness 0.023 0.032*
(0.017) (0.010)
Market Access -0.005
(0.004)
Skill 0.012 0.027* 0.015
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
K-L Ratio -0.018 -0.005
(0.012) (0.014)
Observations 1,526 1,525 1,056 1,518 1,420 1,339
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13
Notes: Standard errors are computed using the delta method (in parentheses).
*, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Probits of Plant Divestiture on Characteristics - Unobserved Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A¢ liate Size 0.058*** 0.069*** 0.059*** 0.032***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.008)
Relative Size -0.037*** -0.050*** -0.039*** -0.015*
(0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009)
Other A¢ liate 0.067*** 0.083** 0.092*** 0.065**
(Country) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025)
Other Acquisition 0.027** 0.014 0.019 0.017
(Country) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Other Divestiture 0.042*** 0.033** 0.056*** 0.014
(Country) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Degree of Inter- -0.060* -0.203*** -0.059 -0.156***
nationalization (0.037) (0.057) (0.040) (0.037)
Labor Productivity -0.011 0.001 -0.017 -0.031*
(0.008) (0.021) (0.012) (0.018)
Sunk Costs -0.000 -0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Market Access -0.006 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Skill 0.013 0.030* 0.019
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
K-L Ratio. -0.000 -0.005 -0.003
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes No No No
Industry Fixed E¤ects? No Yes No No
Region Fixed E¤ects? No No Yes No
Most Exits Fixed E¤ect? No No No Yes
Observations 1,523 1,340 1,339 1,339
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.18
Notes: Standard errors are computed using the delta method (in parentheses).
*, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 1: A rms network of a¢ liates over countries and regions.
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Figure 2: Divestiture and degree of internationalization
33
Figure 3: Divestiture by industry
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Figure 4: Divestiture and size
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